折纸纸鹤 发表于 2011-8-12 10:42 
但祖父悖论就是用来推翻同一世界线的时间旅行的.。。
当然故意不杀延续发展也是有可能的...
历史可以有很多种，但开始和结束的只有一种
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纵使时光相隔百年遥，仍感你心近在咫尺。    这是时次郎百年前对未步的思念啊
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东京少女和穿越时空的少女很好看哟
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折纸纸鹤 发表于 2011-8-12 10:42 
但祖父悖论就是用来推翻同一世界线的时间旅行的.。。
当然故意不杀延续发展也是有可能的...
`10`死凤凰和黑长直从某种一样上来说都是观察者。
我举例不够精准，那么你想想看凉宫春日里面，阿虚那个世界的设定。
阿虚做了那么事情为了补全世界线。
换而言之我们可以这么认为，你祖父之所以能生下你妈是因为，他已经躲过了未来你的，你孙子的，你后辈的追杀
这已经是既定事实了。
然而这既定事实并不妨碍你，或者你的后辈们的意图谋杀。
因为这也是既定事实。
你也可以从海因莱因的【时间足够你爱】中找到相同的观点。
我只是觉得时间旅行的可行性与是不是平行世界无关。
与是否为平行世界有关的是时间旅行的未知后果。
如果是平行世界那么总有未来被改变
如果是同一世界线那么被改变是看上去被改变其实没有被改变而注定要发生的既定事项！
`83`
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归Stebloom 发表于 2011-8-12 10:38 
不一定，如果如果注定将来的你自己杀不掉你的祖父你就没有办法了。
就像命运石之门里，魔法少女里一 ...
但祖父悖论就是用来推翻同一世界线的时间旅行的.。。
当然故意不杀延续发展也是有可能的...
石头门的小冈伦有特殊体质涅...
黑长直的无限loop不见得是在同一平行世界中..
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@19# 我能活到99岁
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折纸纸鹤 发表于 2011-8-12 10:34 
时间旅行要建立在平行空间和世界线理论上吧..同一条世界线时间旅行的话会有祖辈悖论哦～ ...
`89`不一定，如果如果注定将来的你自己杀不掉你的祖父你就没有办法了。
就像命运石之门里，魔法少女里一样，如果有的人注定要死，那么就说明
有的人注定死不了。
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时间旅行要建立在平行空间和世界线理论上吧..同一条世界线时间旅行的话会有祖辈悖论哦～
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猜不到的ID 发表于 2011-8-12 01:54 
这个在小说里经常出现啊，说神马在小黑屋里假装用炙热的硬币烫一下，出来后居然真的有印记。
也不知道是真 ...
`5`对的，据说，人家做实验，把冰心理暗示成烙铁，结果烫伤了
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这个在小说里经常出现啊，说神马在小黑屋里假装用炙热的硬币烫一下，出来后居然真的有印记。
也不知道是真是假，我们大多数人类对这个世界的认识还是很少啊#1923#
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@ou#挽尊
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概念·弑杀 发表于 2011-8-12 15:35 
——我思，故我在
——我在，故我思（存在主义）
——————————————————
说到底也只是唯物主义和唯心主义的战场而已
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——我思，故我在
——我在，故我思（存在主义）
——————————————————
其实上面这两句，还应该有反向推定的：
——我不思，则我不在
——我不在，则我不思
存在神马的，很简单就能够消灭！
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乃中二了= =
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我们最终都会变成鲜橙多lcl~
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....我们挥一挥衣袖不带走一片云彩<.....
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我们从哪里来就将要到哪里去
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娘胎
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=367=全体自杀 吗 ？
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`66`大学公开课都不错～
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wz。
有兴趣哟~
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折纸纸鹤 发表于 2011-8-10 08:40 
求全篇翻译
【1】意译+少许感悟和解释，我英语水平不高。多多包涵`83`
宇宙机械论就关于宇宙自然的一种理论，与早期现代的机械论紧密相关。含义在于，把宇宙理解成一个完整的机械系统，包含所有的物质，所有物质也严格遵守着自然的法则。那些机械论者把科学革命的成就的所有现象认为是，可以把宇宙看作机械的证据，自然法则统治物质的运动和碰撞。机械论是一种完完全全的决定论。
【决定论是指：排除自由意志，认为个性或行为均由环境和自己不能控制的因素决定。】如果所有现象都可以完全的被物理法则解释，就像钟的齿轮一样运行并注定被决定的一样，敲过一点之后过一个小时就会敲两点，那么所有的现象都是由物质的性质和自然法则的运作所决定的。
【就像XXXholics里侑子说的：这世上没有偶然，只有必然。】
并且，决定论暗示了，宇宙机械比钟的机械更为严密而不可抗拒。
尽管钟的机械可能因为部分的损坏而停止工作，而宇宙机械的部分却并不比它的整体来的可以忽视，任何宇宙机械坏掉的部分人就是宇宙的一部分，或者说坏掉这件事本身也遵守了自然的法则。
争取时不时有空翻一段。。。。`89`懒人。
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本帖最后由 归Stebloom 于 2011-8-10 11:01 编辑
折纸纸鹤 发表于 2011-8-10 08:40 
求全篇翻译
翻概述～求奖励～～～`52`
简单来说：
机械论的意思就是，世上万物都是像机械一样运作的并没有其内在联系。
就是说，如果你突然有个想法想吃上海的小笼包，那么其他人可能说是因为你看到什么或者想到什么才想到这个怪点子的，
那么机械论就认为，你这么想其实并不是你会这么想而想到的，而是因为你所有一生中经历的各种化学物质，物理外力所在你体内造成了种种反应最终在那时那刻想到了这个东西。你想到的也不是念头而是化学物质。
而机械论又分两种，一种是用来解释宇宙万物的，宇宙机械论；一种是专门用来解释人类的，人类机械论。而后种被现在的人广为议论。
机械论是一种和亚里士多德的自然发展论相反的概念。
并成为一种形而上学。
形而上学的意思是，论自然的存在，真理和知识的学问。
这是意译，也是俺自己的看法。
要奖励，要撒花·～`43`
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英文无力
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求全篇翻译@63#
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`27`哪段看不懂？俺可以稍微解释下。全部翻译`39`你懂的，我懒～
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Anthropic mechanismThe debate over anthropic mechanism seems here to stay, at least for the time being. The thesis in anthropic mechanism is not that everything can be completely explained in mechanical terms (although some anthropic mechanists may also believe that), but rather that everything about human beings can be completely explained in mechanical terms, as surely as can everything about clockwork or gasoline engines.
One of the chief obstacles that all mechanistic theories have faced is providing a mechanistic explanation of the human mind; Descartes, for one, endorsed dualism in spite of endorsing a completely mechanistic conception of the material world because he argued that mechanism and the notion of a mind were logically incompatible. Hobbes, on the other hand, conceived of the mind and the will as purely mechanistic, completely explicable in terms of the effects of perception and the pursuit of desire, which in turn he held to be completely explicable in terms of the materialistic operations of the nervous system. Following Hobbes, other mechanists argued for a thoroughly mechanistic explanation of the mind, with one of the most influential and controversial expositions of the doctrine being offered by Julien Offray de La Mettrie in his Man a Machine (1748).
Today, as in the past, the main points of debate between anthropic mechanists and anti-mechanists are mainly occupied with two topics: the mind — and consciousness, in particular — and free will. Anti-mechanists argue that anthropic mechanism is incompatible with our commonsense intuitions: in philosophy of mind they argue that unconscious matter cannot completely explain the phenomenon of consciousness, and in metaphysics they argue that anthropic mechanism implies determinism about human action, which (they argue) is incompatible with our understanding of ourselves as creatures with free will. Contemporary philosophers who have argued for this position include Norman Malcolm and David Chalmers.
Anthropic mechanists typically respond in one of two ways. In the first, they agree with anti-mechanists that mechanism conflicts with some of our commonsense intuitions, but go on to argue that our commonsense intuitions are simply mistaken and need to be revised. Down this path lies eliminative materialism in philosophy of mind, and hard determinism on the question of free will. This option is popular with some scientists, but it is rejected by most philosophers[who?], although not by its most well-known advocate, the eliminative materialist philosopher Paul Churchland. What is far from clear is how eliminative materialism is compatibile with the freedom of will apparently required for anyone (including its adherents) to make truth claims.[3] The second option, common amongst philosophers who adopt anthropic mechanism, is to argue that the arguments given for incompatibility are specious: whatever it is we mean by "consciousness" and "free will," they urge, it is fully compatible with a mechanistic understanding of the human mind and will. As a result they tend to argue for one or another non-eliminativist physicalist theories of mind, and for compatibilism on the question of free will. Contemporary philosophers who have argued for this sort of account include J. J. C. Smart and Daniel Dennett.
[edit] Gödelian argumentsSome scholars have debated over what, if anything, Gödel's incompleteness theorems imply about anthropic mechanism. Much of the debate centers on whether the human mind is equivalent to a Turing machine, or by the Church-Turing thesis, any finite machine at all. If it is, and if the machine is consistent, then Gödel's incompleteness theorems would apply to it.
One of the earliest attempts to use incompleteness to reason about human intelligence was by Gödel himself in his 1951 Gibbs lecture entitled "Some basic theorems on the foundations of mathematics and their philosophical implications".[4] In this lecture, Gödel uses the incompleteness theorem to arrive at the following disjunction: (a) the human mind is not a consistent finite machine, or (b) there exist Diophantine equations for which it cannot decide whether solutions exist. Gödel finds (b) implausible, and thus seems to have believed the human mind was not equivalent to a finite machine, i.e., its power exceeded that of any finite machine. He recognized that this was only a conjecture, since one could never disprove (b). Yet he considered the disjunctive conclusion to be a "certain fact".
In subsequent years, more direct anti-mechanist lines of reasoning were apparently floating around the intellectual atmosphere. In 1960, Hilary Putnam published a paper entitled "Minds and Machines," in which he points out the flaws of a typical anti-mechanist argument.[5] Informally, this is the argument that the (alleged) difference between "what can be mechanically proven" and "what can be seen to be true by humans" shows that human intelligence is not mechanical in nature. Or, as Putnam puts it:
Let T be a Turing machine which "represents" me in the sense that T can prove just the mathematical statements I prove. Then using Gödel's technique I can discover a proposition that T cannot prove, and moreover I can prove this proposition. This refutes the assumption that T "represents" me, hence I am not a Turing machine.
Hilary Putnam objects that this argument ignores the issue of consistency. Gödel's technique can only be applied to consistent systems. It is conceivable, argues Putnam, that the human mind is inconsistent. If one is to use Gödel's technique to prove the proposition that T cannot prove, one must first prove (the mathematical statement representing) the consistency of T, a daunting and perhaps impossible task. Later Putnam suggested that while Gödel's theorems cannot be applied to humans, since they make mistakes and are therefore inconsistent, it may be applied to the human faculty of science or mathematics in general. If we are to believe that it is consistent, then either we cannot prove its consistency, or it cannot be represented by a Turing machine.[6]
J. R. Lucas in Minds, Machines and Gödel (1963), and later in his book The Freedom of the Will (1970), lays out an anti-mechanist argument closely following the one described by Putnam, including reasons for why the human mind can be considered consistent.[7] Lucas admits that, by Gödel's second theorem, a human mind cannot formally prove its own consistency, and even says (perhaps facetiously) that women and politicians are inconsistent. Nevertheless, he sets out arguments for why a male non-politician can be considered consistent. These arguments are philosophical in nature and are the subject of much debate; Lucas provides references to responses on his own website.
Another work was done by Judson Webb in his 1968 paper "Metamathematics and the Philosophy of Mind".[8] Webb claims that previous attempts have glossed over whether one truly can see that the Gödelian statement p pertaining to oneself, is true. Using a different formulation of Gödel's theorems, namely, that of Raymond Smullyan and Emil Post, Webb shows one can derive convincing arguments for oneself of both the truth and falsity of p. He furthermore argues that all arguments about the philosophical implications of Gödel's theorems are really arguments about whether the Church-Turing thesis is true.
Later, Roger Penrose entered the fray, providing somewhat novel anti-mechanist arguments in his books, The Emperor's New Mind (1989) [ENM] and Shadows of the Mind (1994) [SM]. These books have proved highly controversial. Martin Davis responded to ENM in his paper "Is Mathematical Insight Algorithmic?" (ps), where he argues that Penrose ignores the issue of consistency. Solomon Feferman gives a critical examination of SM in his paper "Penrose's Gödelian argument" (pdf).
One of the most lucid statements of a Gödel based anti-mechanism argument can be found in Douglas Hofstadter's Pulitzer Prize winning book Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. This is particularly interesting, in that Hofstadter is widely viewed as one of the better known skeptics of such argument:
Looked at this way, Gödel's proof suggests – though by no means does it prove! – that there could be some high-level way of viewing the mind/brain, involving concepts which do not appear on lower levels, and that this level might have explanatory power that does not exist – not even in principle – on lower levels. It would mean that some facts could be explained on the high level quite easily, but not on lower levels at all. No matter how long and cumbersome a low-level statement were made, it would not explain the phenomena in question. It is analogous to the fact that, if you make derivation after derivation in Peano arithmetic, no matter how long and cumbersome you make them, you will never come up with one for G – despite the fact that on a higher level, you can see that the Gödel sentence is true. What might such high-level concepts be? It has been proposed for eons, by various holistically or "soulistically" inclined scientists and humanists that consciousness is a phenomenon that escapes explanation in terms of brain components; so here is a candidate at least. There is also the ever-puzzling notion of free will. So perhaps these qualities could be "emergent" in the sense of requiring explanations which cannot be furnished by the physiology alone (Gödel, Escher, Bach, p. 708).[9]
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Universal mechanismThe older doctrine which we have called universal mechanism is a theory about the nature of the universe, closely linked with the early modern version of materialism. Universal mechanism held that the universe is best understood as a completely mechanical system—that is, a system composed entirely of matter in motion under a complete and regular system of laws of nature. The mechanists understood the achievements of the scientific revolution to show that every phenomenon in the universe could eventually be explained in terms of 'mechanical' laws: that is, in terms of natural laws governing the motion and collision of matter. It follows that mechanism is a form of thoroughgoing determinism: if all phenomena can be explained entirely through the motion of matter under physical laws, then just as surely as the gears of a clock completely determine that it will strike 2:00 an hour after it strikes 1:00, all phenomena are completely determined by the properties of that matter and the operations of those natural laws.
Indeed, the determinism implied by universal mechanism is even stronger than clockwork.
Whereas the mechanism of a clock may cease to work predictably as its parts break down, the "parts" of the system in universal mechanism are nothing less than everything in the universe — anything that they "broke down" into would still be a part of the universe, and so would still be subject to the mechanistic laws of nature.
The French mechanist and determinist Pierre Simon de Laplace formulated the sweeping implications of this thesis by saying:
"We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of the past and the cause of the future. An intellect which at any given moment knew all of the forces that animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that compose it, if this intellect were vast enough to submit the data to analysis, could condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom; for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes." Pierre Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities
One of the first and most famous expositions of universal mechanism is found in the opening passages of the Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes (1651). What is less frequently appreciated is that René Descartes, who is today remembered mainly as a paradigmatic enemy of materialism and mechanism (and in that respect quite the opposite of Hobbes), also did much to advance the mechanistic understanding of nature, in both his scientific works on mechanics and in his philosophical works on metaphysics.
Descartes was a substance dualist, and argued that reality was composed of two radically different types of substance: corporeal substance, on the one hand, and mental substance, on the other hand. Descartes steadfastly denied that the human mind could be explained in terms of the configurations of corporeal substance (a chief claim of all forms of mechanism). Nevertheless, his understanding of corporeal substance was thoroughly mechanistic.
"I should like you to consider that these functions (including passion, memory, and imagination) follow from the mere arrangement of the machine’s organs every bit as naturally as the movements of a clock or other automaton follow from the arrangement of its counter-weights and wheels." (Descartes, Treatise on Man, p.108)
His scientific work was based on the understanding of all natural objects, including not only billiard balls and rocks, but also non-human animals and even human bodies, as completely mechanistic automata. Descartes' dualism was, in no small part, motivated by the fact that he could see no place for the soul or for freedom of the will in his thoroughly mechanistic understanding of nature. Ancient naturalists such as Aristotle, on the other hand, had no need for substance dualism because their conception of nature was teleological rather than mechanistic, and was compatible with a robust sense of human freedom. Descartes, then, can be seen as agreeing with the early modern mechanists, and disagreeing with Aristotle, on the nature of the physical world. The difference between Descartes and his mechanist colleagues was that mechanists either saw no problem for the notions of soul and freedom of the will, or else were simply willing to dispense with these notions altogether.
The mechanistic worldview gained considerable favor with the revolutionary successes of Isaac Newton, whose work in mechanics seemed to successfully explain the motion of everything in heaven and in earth according to the operation of a single mechanical principle. To be sure, that principle — universal gravitation — was something of a disappointment to the older cadre of mechanists, since mechanism originally sought to explain all phenomena entirely in terms of the motion and collision of material bodies, whereas Newton's principle of gravitation required action at a distance. Nevertheless, the generation of philosophers who were inspired by Newton's example carried the mechanist banner. Chief among them were French philosophers such as Julien Offray de La Mettrie and Denis Diderot (see also: French materialism).
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：30：这种贴要顶置！！苏伊酱！
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`48`
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碗
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归Stebloom 发表于 2011-8-10 10:24 
那还不是暧昧不清？！！
=1256= 还没到暧昧的阶段俺就已经拒绝过他了。。。结果这是第二次。。他这么锲而不舍搞的我倒是很不好回绝了。。哎呦 =273=
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一起来喝三鹿 发表于 2011-8-10 10:17 
木有 是他喜欢我...T T而且看的电影是变形金刚...那电影我都看过了 ...
而且 = =俺不喜番他...  ...
`91`那还不是暧昧不清？！！
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归Stebloom 发表于 2011-8-10 07:10 
我曾经收藏过你滴头像
话说是哈利波特7 吗？犹豫不决是因为有喜欢或者暧昧不清的人吗？
啊呀，俺好像 ...
木有 是他喜欢我...T T而且看的电影是变形金刚...那电影我都看过了 ...
而且 = =俺不喜番他...
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一起来喝三鹿 发表于 2011-8-10 03:50 
WZ~~
我曾经收藏过你滴头像`5`
话说是哈利波特7 吗？犹豫不决是因为有喜欢或者暧昧不清的人吗？
啊呀，俺好像八卦了～
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WZ~~
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后续：庄子看了很多遍，虽然很不喜欢这样子一下子贴出来，但是拾篇就拾整篇吧。
希望大家可以回帖说说对某一段的看法，或者间接。
我觉得我们中国的哲学，比国外的好多了。
特别是老庄之道，我觉得简直是世界上最强大的信仰，没有之一。
因为它不倚靠着任何一个偶像，世界是虚无的那它便就是虚无的！
世界是无善恶的，那它便就是无善恶的！
不是因为没有限制让人感到害怕而随意的捏造或精心的捏造出一个框架，让人心安！
人活在这世上就是无所依萍的，若觉得惶惶不安，就惶惶不安罢
若是人融合的在世中又有何所惧！
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译文：知道自然的作为，并且了解人的作为，这就达到了认识的极点。知道自然的作为，是懂得事物出于自然；了解人的作为，是用他智慧所通晓的知识哺育、薰陶他智慧所未能通晓的知识，直至自然死亡而不中途夭折，这恐怕就是认识的最高境界了。虽然这样，还是存在忧患。人们的知识一定要有所依凭方才能认定是否恰当，而认识的对象却是不稳定的。怎么知道我所说的本于自然的东西不是出于人为呢，怎么知道我所说的人为的东西又不是出于自然呢？况且有了“真人”方才有真知。什么叫做“真人”呢？古时候的“真人”，不倚众凌寡，不自恃成功雄踞他人，也不图谋琐事。像这样的人，错过了时机不后悔，赶上了机遇不得意。象这样的人，登上高处不颤栗，下到水里不会沾湿，进入火中不觉灼热。这只有智慧能通达大道境界的人方才能像这样。古时候的“真人”，他睡觉时不做梦，他醒来时不忧愁，他吃东西时不求甘美，他呼吸时气息深沉。“真人”呼吸凭借的是着地的脚根，而一般人呼吸则靠的只是喉咙。被人屈服时，言语在喉前吞吐就像哇哇地曼语。那些嗜好和欲望太深的人，他们天生的智慧也就很浅。古时候的“真人”，不懂得喜悦生存，也不懂得厌恶死亡；出生不欣喜，入死不推辞；无拘无束地就走了，自由自在地又来了罢了。不忘记自己从哪儿来，也不寻求自己往哪儿去，承受什么际遇都欢欢喜喜，忘掉死生像是回到了自己的本然，这就叫做不用心智去损害大道，也不用人为的因素去帮助自然。这就叫“真人”。像这样的人，他的内心忘掉了周围的一切，他的容颜淡漠安闲，他的面额质朴端严；冷肃得像秋天，温暖得像春天，高兴或愤怒跟四时更替一样自然无饰，和外界事物合宜相称而没有谁能探测到他精神世界的真谛。所以古代圣人使用武力，灭掉敌国却不失掉敌国的民心；利益和恩泽广施于万世，却不是为了偏爱什么人。乐于交往取悦外物的人，不是圣人；有偏爱就算不上是“仁”；伺机行事，不是贤人；不能看到利害的相通和相辅，算不上是君子；办事求名而失掉自身的本性，不是有识之士；丧失身躯却与自己的真性不符，不是能役使世人的人。像狐不偕、务光、伯夷、叔齐、箕子、胥余、纪他、申徒狄，这样的人都是被役使世人的人所役使，都是被安适世人的人所安适，而不是能使自己得到安适的人。古时候的“真人”，神情嵬峨而不矜持，好像不足却又无所承受；态度安闲自然、特立超群而不执着顽固，襟怀宽阔虚空而不浮华；怡然欣喜像是格外地高兴，一举一动又像是出自不得已！容颜和悦令人喜欢接近，与人交往德性宽和让人乐于归依；气度博大像是宽广的世界！高放自得从不受什么限制，绵邈深远好像喜欢封闭自己，心不在焉的样子又好像忘记了要说的话。把刑律当作主体，把礼仪当作羽翼，用已掌握的知识去等待时机，用道德来遵循规律。把刑律当作主体的人，那么杀了人也是宽厚仁慈的；把礼仪当作羽翼的人，用礼仪的教诲在世上施行；用已掌握的知识去等待时机的人，是因为对各种事情出于不得已；用道德来遵循规律，就像是说大凡有脚的人就能够登上山丘，而人们却真以为是勤于行走的人。所以说人们所喜好的是浑然为一的，人们不喜好的也是浑然为一的。那些同一的东西是浑一的，那些不同一的东西也是浑一的。那些同一的东西跟自然同类，那些不同一的东西跟人同类。自然与人不可能相互对立而相互超越，具有这种认识的人就叫做“真人”。 　　死和生均非人为之力所能安排，犹如黑夜和白天交替那样永恒地变化，完全出于自然。有些事情人是不可能参与和干预的，这都是事物自身变化的实情。人们总是把天看作生命之父，而且终身爱戴它，何况那特立高超的“道”呢！人们还总认为国君是一定超越自己的，而且终身愿为国君效死，又何况应该宗为大师的“道”呢？泉水干涸了，鱼儿困在陆地上相互依偎，互相大口出气来取得一点湿气，以唾沫相互润湿使得彼此得以继续生存，不如忘记彼此的存在，自由的在江湖之中畅游。与其赞誉唐尧的圣明而非议夏桀的暴虐，不如把他们都忘掉而融化混同于“道”。大地把我的形体托载，并且用生存来劳苦我，用衰老来闲适我，用死亡来安息我。所以，把我的存在看作好事的，也就因此而可以把我的死亡看作是好事。将船儿藏在大山沟里，将渔具藏在深水里，可以说是十分牢靠了。然而半夜里有个大力士把它们连同山谷和河泽一块儿背着跑了，睡梦中的人们还一点儿也不知道。将小东西藏在大东西里是适宜的，不过还是会有丢失。假如把天下藏在天下里而不会丢失，这就是事物固有的真实之情。人们只要承受了人的形体便十分欣喜，至于像人的形体的情况，在万千变化中从不曾有过穷尽，那快乐之情难道还能够加以计算吗？所以圣人将生活在各种事物都不会丢失的环境里而与万物共存亡。以少为善以老为善，以始为善以终为善，人们尚且加以效法，又何况那万物所联缀、各种变化所依托的“道”呢！ “道”是真实而又确凿可信的，然而它又是无为和无形的；“道”可以感知却不可以口授，可以领悟却不可以面见；“道”自身就是本、就是根，还未出现天地的远古时代“道”就已经存在；它引出鬼帝，产生天地；它在太极之上却并不算高，它在六极之下不算深，它先于天地存在还不算久，它长于上古还不算老。狶韦氏得到它，用来统驭天地；伏羲氏得到它，用来调合元气；北斗星得到它，永远不会改变方位；太阳和月亮得到它，永远不停息地运行；堪坏得到它，用来入主昆仑山；冯夷得到它，用来巡游大江大河；肩吾得到它，用来驻守泰山；黄帝得到它，用来登上云天；颛顼得到它，用来居处玄宫；禹强得到它，用来立足北极；西王母得到它，用来坐阵少广山。没有人能知道它的开始，也没有人能知道它的终结。彭祖得到它，从远古的有虞时代一直活到五伯时代；傅说得到它，用来辅佐武丁，统辖整个天下，乘驾东维星，骑坐箕宿和尾宿，而永远排列在星神的行列里。 　　南伯子葵向女偊问道：“你的岁数已经很大了，可是你的容颜却像孩童，这是什么缘故呢？”女偊回答：“我得‘道’了。”南伯子葵说：“‘道’可以学习吗？”女偊回答说：“不！怎么可以呢！你不是可以学习‘道’的人。卜梁倚有圣人明敏的才气却没有圣人虚淡的心境，我有圣人虚淡的心境却没有圣人明敏的才气，我想用虚淡的心境来教导他，恐怕他果真能成为圣人哩！然而却不是这样，把圣人虚淡的心境传告具有圣人才气的人，应是很容易的。我还是持守着并告诉他，三天之后便能遗忘天下，既已遗忘天下，我又凝寂持守，七天之后能遗忘万物；既已遗忘外物，我又凝寂持守，九天之后便能遗忘自身的存在；既已遗忘存在的生命，而后心境便能如朝阳一般清新明彻；能够心境如朝阳般清新明彻，而后就能够感受那绝无所待的‘道’了；既已感受了‘道’，而后就能超越古今的时限；既已能够超越古今的时限，而后便进入无所谓生、无所谓死的境界。摒除了生也就没有死，留恋于生也就不存在生。作为事物，‘道’无不有所送，也无不有所迎；无不有所毁，也无不有所成，这就叫做‘撄宁’。撄宁，意思就是不受外界事物的纷扰，而后保持心境的宁静。” 南伯子葵又问：“你偏偏是怎么得‘道’的呢？”女偊又回答说：“我从副墨（文字）的儿子那里听到的，副墨的儿子从洛诵（背诵）的孙子那里听到的，洛诵的孙子从瞻明（目视明晰）那里听到的，瞻明从聂许（附耳私语）那里听到的，聂许从需役（勤行不怠）那里听到的，需役从於讴（吟咏领会）那里听到的，於讴从玄冥（深远虚寂）那里听到的，玄冥从参寥（高旷寥远）那里听到的，参寥从疑始（迷茫而无所本）那里听到的。” 　　子祀、子舆、子犁、子来四个人在一块摆谈说：“谁能够把无当作头，把生当作脊柱，把死当作尻尾，谁能够通晓生死存亡浑为一体的道理，我们就可以跟他交朋友。”四个人都会心地相视而笑，心心相契却不说话，于是相互交往成为朋友。不久子舆生了病，子祀前去探望他。子舆说：“伟大啊，造物者！把我变成如此曲屈不伸的样子！腰弯背驼，五脏穴口朝上，下巴隐藏在肚脐之下，肩部高过头顶，弯曲的颈椎形如赘瘤朝天隆起”。阴阳二气不和酿成如此灾害，可是子舆的心里却十分闲逸好像没有生病似的，蹒跚地来到井边对着井水照看自己，说：“哎呀，造物者竟把我变成如此曲屈不伸！” 子祀说：“你讨厌这曲屈不伸的样子吗？”子舆回答：“没有，我怎么会讨厌这副样子！假令造物者逐渐把我的左臂变成公鸡，我便用它来报晓；假令造物者逐渐把我的右臂变成弹弓，我便用它来打斑鸠烤熟了吃。假令造物者把我的臀部变化成为车轮，把我的精神变化成骏马，我就用来乘坐，难道还要更换别的车马吗？至于生命的获得，是因为适时，生命的丧失，是因为顺应；安于适时而处之顺应，悲哀和欢乐都不会侵入心房。这就是古人所说的解脱了倒悬之苦，然而不能自我解脱的原因，则是受到了外物的束缚。况且事物的变化不能超越自然的力量已经很久很久，我又怎么能厌恶自己现在的变化呢？” 不久子来也生了病，气息急促将要死去，他的妻子儿女围在床前哭泣。子犁前往探望，说：“嘿，走开！不要惊扰他由生而死的变化！”子犁靠着门跟子来说话：“伟大啊，造物者！又将把你变成什么，把你送到何方？把你变化成老鼠的肝脏吗？把你变化成虫蚁的臂膀吗？” 子来说：“父母对于子女，无论东西南北，他们都只能听从吩咐调遣。自然的变化对于人，则不啻于父母；它使我靠拢死亡而我却不听从，那么我就太蛮横了，而它有什么过错呢！大地把我的形体托载，用生存来劳苦我，用衰老来闲适我，用死亡来安息我。所以把我的存在看作是好事，也因此可以把我的死亡看作是好事。现在如果有一个高超的冶炼工匠铸造金属器皿，金属熔解后跃起说‘我将必须成为良剑莫邪’，冶炼工匠必定认为这是不吉祥的金属。如今人一旦承受了人的外形，便说‘成人了成人了’，造物者一定会认为这是不吉祥的人。如今把整个浑一的天地当作大熔炉，把造物者当作高超的冶炼工匠，用什么方法来驱遣我而不可以呢？”于是安闲熟睡似的离开人世，又好像惊喜地醒过来而回到人间。 　　子桑户、孟子反、子琴张三人在一起谈话：“谁能够相互交往于无心交往之中，相互有所帮助却像没有帮助一样？谁能登上高天巡游雾里，循环升登于无穷的太空，忘掉自己的存在，而永远没有终结和穷尽？”三人会心地相视而笑，心心相印于是相互结成好友。过不多久子桑户死了，还没有下葬。孔子知道了，派弟子子贡前去帮助料理丧事。孟子反和子琴张却一个在编曲，一个在弹琴，相互应和着唱歌：“哎呀，子桑户啊！哎呀，子桑户啊！你已经返归本真，可是我们还成为活着的人而托载形骸呀！”子贡听了快步走到他们近前，说：“我冒昧地请教，对着死人的尸体唱歌，这合乎礼仪吗？”二人相视笑了笑，不屑地说：“这种人怎么会懂得‘礼’的真实含意！” 子贡回来后把见到的情况告诉给孔子，说：“他们都是些什么样的人呢？不看重德行的培养而无有礼仪，把自身的形骸置于度外，面对着死尸还要唱歌，容颜和脸色一点也不改变，没有什么办法可以用来称述他们。他们究竟是些什么样的人呢？” 孔子说：“他们都是些摆脱礼仪约束而逍遥于人世之外的人，我却是生活在具体的世俗环境中的人。人世之外和人世之内彼此不相干涉，可是我却让你前去吊唁，我实在是浅薄呀！他们正跟造物者结为伴侣，而逍遥于天地浑一的元气之中。他们把人的生命看作像赘瘤一样多余，他们把人的死亡看作是毒痈化脓后的溃破，像这样的人，又怎么会顾及死生优劣的存在！凭借于各各不同的物类，但最终寄托于同一的整体；忘掉了体内的肝胆，也忘掉了体外的耳目；无尽地反复着终结和开始，但从不知道它们的头绪；茫茫然彷徨于人世之外，逍遥自在地生活在无所作为的环境中。他们又怎么会烦乱地去炮制世俗的礼仪，而故意炫耀于众人的耳目之前呢！” 子贡说：“如此，那么先生将遵循什么准则呢？”孔子说：“我孔丘，乃是苍天所惩罚的罪人。即使这样，我仍将跟你们一道去竭力追求至高无上的‘道’。子贡问：“请问追求‘道’的方法。”孔子回答：“鱼争相投水，人争相求道。争相投水的鱼，掘地成池便给养充裕；争相求道的人，漠然无所作为便心性平适。所以说，鱼相忘于天下里，人相忘于道术中”。子贡说：“再冒昧地请教‘畸人’的问题”。孔子回答：“所谓‘畸人’，就是不同于世俗而又等同于自然的人。所以说，自然的小人就是人世间的君子；人世间的君子就是自然的小人。” 　　颜回请教孔子说：“孟孙才这个人，他的母亲死了，哭泣时没有一滴眼泪，心中不觉悲伤，居丧时也不哀痛。这三个方面没有任何悲哀的表现，可是却因善于处理丧事而名扬鲁国。难道真会有无其实而有其名的情况吗？颜回实在觉得奇怪。” 孔子说：“孟孙才处理丧事的作法确实是尽善尽美了，大大超过了懂得丧葬礼仪的人。人们总希望从简治丧却不能办到，而孟孙才已经做到从简办理丧事了。孟孙才不过问人因为什么而生，也不去探寻人因为什么而死；不知道趋赴生，也不知道靠拢死；他顺应自然的变化而成为他应该变成的物类，以期待那些自己所不知晓的变化！况且即将出现变化，怎么知道不变化呢？即将不再发生变化，又怎么知道已经有了变化呢！只有我和你呀，才是做梦似的没有一点儿觉醒的人呢！那些死去了的人惊扰了自身形骸却无损于他们的精神，犹如精神的寓所朝夕改变却并不是精神的真正死亡。唯独孟孙才觉醒，人们哭他也跟着哭，这就是他如此居丧的原因。况且人们交往总借助形骸而称述自我，又怎么知道我所称述的躯体一定就是我呢？而且你梦中变成鸟便振翅直飞蓝天，你梦中变成鱼便摇尾潜入深渊。不知道今天我们说话的人，算是醒悟的人呢，还是做梦的人呢？心境快适却来不及笑出声音，表露快意发出笑声却来不及排解和消泄，安于自然的推移而且忘却死亡的变化，于是就进入到寂寥虚空的自然而浑然成为一体。” 　　意而子拜访许由。许由说：“尧把什么东西给予了你？”意而子说：“尧对我说：‘你一定得亲身实践仁义并明白无误地阐明是非’”。许由说：“你怎么还要来我这里呢？尧已经用‘仁义’在你的额上刻下了印记，又用‘是非’割下了你的鼻子，你将凭借什么游处于逍遥放荡、纵任不拘、辗转变化的道途呢？”意而子说：“虽然这样，我还是希望能游处于如此的境域。” 许由说：“不对。有眼无珠的盲人没法跟他观赏佼好的眉目和容颜，瞎子没法跟他赏鉴礼服上各种不同颜色的花纹。”意而子说：“无庄不再打扮忘掉自己的美丽，据梁不再逞强忘掉自己的勇力，黄帝闻‘道’之后忘掉自己的智慧，他们都因为经过了‘道’的冶炼和锻打。怎么知道那造物者不会养息我受黥刑的伤痕和补全我受劓刑所残缺的鼻子，使我得以保全托载精神的身躯而跟随先生呢？” 许由说：“唉！这可是不可能知道的。我还是给你说个大概吧。‘道’是我伟大的宗师啊！我伟大的宗师啊！把万物碎成粉末不是为了某种道义，把恩泽施于万世不是出于仁义，长于上古不算老，回天载地、雕创众物之形也不算技巧。这就进入‘道’的境界了。” 　　颜回说：“我进步了。”孔子问道：“你的进步指的是什么？”颜回说：“我已经忘却仁义了。”孔子说：“好哇，不过还不够。”过了几天颜回再次拜见孔子，说：“我又进步了。”孔子问：“你的进步指的是什么？”颜回说：“我忘却礼乐了。”孔子说：“好哇，不过还不够。”过了几天颜回又再次拜见孔子，说：“我又进步了。”孔子问：“你的进步指的是什么？”颜回说：“我‘坐忘’了”。孔子惊奇不安地问：“什么叫‘坐忘’？”颜回答道：“毁废了强健的肢体，退除了灵敏的听觉和清晰的视力，脱离了身躯并抛弃了智慧，从而与大道浑同相通为一体，这就叫静坐心空物我两忘的‘坐忘’。”孔子说：“与万物同一就没有偏好，顺应变化就不执滞常理。你果真成了贤人啊！我作为老师也希望能跟随学习而步你的后尘。” 　　子舆和子桑是好朋友，连绵的阴雨下了十日，子舆说：“子桑恐怕已经困乏而饿倒。”便包着饭食前去给他吃。来到子桑门前，就听见子桑好像在唱歌，又好像在哭泣，而且还弹着琴：“是父亲呢？还是母亲呢？是天呢？还是人呢？”声音微弱好像禁不住感情的表达，急促地吐露着歌词。子舆走进屋子说：“你歌唱的诗词，为什么象这样？”子桑回答说：“我在探寻使我达到如此极度困乏和窘迫的人，然而没有找到。父母难道会希望我贫困吗？苍天没有偏私地覆盖着整个大地，大地没有偏私地托载着所有生灵，天地难道会单单让我贫困吗？寻找使我贫困的东西可是我没能找到。然而已经达到如此极度的困乏，还是‘命’啊！
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